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The Bionic Brain: Pragmatic Neuroethics and the Moral Plausibility of Cognitive
Enhancement
By
Dr. Peter A. DePergola II
University of Massachusetts Medical School
College of Our Lady of the Elms
ABSTRACT
The seemingly infinite possibilities of contemporary neuroscience span from the
augmentation of memory, executive function, appetite, libido, sleep, and mood, to the
maturation and development of emotional health and personality. These prospects hint at
the capacity to alter neurocognitive conceptions of reality. They also mark the
unavoidable inculcation of nuanced individual responses, perhaps radical, to these “tailormade” perceptions. Hence, there exists certain neuroethical, and even more generally,
existential risks within this fascinating and expeditious enterprise. The primary question
in the context of present-day neurotechnology is not what can be done, but what should
be. To that end, this paper examines the concepts of memory, executive function, and
emotional health and personality in the context of neurocognitive enhancement and posits
the argument that neurocognitive enhancement can be justified as morally plausible in its
potential to edify the caliber of overall cognition, and thus contribute to the ability to
make pragmatically, robust moral decisions on the conditions that it (1) promotes general
moral character, (2) compliments human nature, and (3) effects a deeper sense of
individual and social identity.
Keywords: Neuroscience, Neuroethics, Cognitive enhancement, Cognitive
manipulation
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THE BIONIC BRAIN: PRAGMATIC NEUROETHICS AND THE MORAL
PLAUSIBILITY OF COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT
Dr. Peter A. DePergola II

INTRODUCTION
The seemingly infinite possibilities of contemporary neuroscience span from the
augmentation of memory, executive function, appetite, libido, sleep, and mood1 to the
maturation and development of emotional health and personality.2 These prospects hint at
the capacity to alter neurocognitive conceptions of reality. They also mark the
unavoidable inculcation of nuanced individual responses, perhaps radical, to these “tailormade” perceptions. Hence, there exists certain neuroethical,3 and even more generally
existential, risks within this fascinating and expeditious enterprise. The primary question
in the context of present-day neurotechnology is not what can be done, but what should
be.
To date, the debate over enhancement has been riddled with fallacious and
ambiguous rhetoric, and the effect has spawned a bitter stalemate between the primary
interlocutors. One cause of the current impasse is the mistaken idea that to enhance
something – or, in the neuroscientific context, to allow greater access into dormant but
existent biological faculties – de facto denotes the pursuit of its mastery or perfection.
This is the concern, for example, of the 20034 President’s Council on Bioethics5 explored
in their document “Beyond Therapy.”6 For this group, neurocognitive enhancement7
paves the already-too-tempting road to a brave new world in which humans are gods of
their own. A converse view, to which this paper subscribes, contends that the concepts of
enhancement and perfection are mutually exclusive, and that enhancement has little to do,

1. Martha J. Farah, Judy Illes, Robert Cook-Deegan, Howard Gardner, Eric Kandel, Patricia King,
Eric Parens, Barbara Sahakian, and Paul Root Wolpe, “Neurocognitive Enhancement: What Can We Do
and What Should We Do?” in Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings, ed. Martha J. Farah
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 30-41.
2. Turhan Canli and Zenab Amin, “Neuroimaging of Emotion and Personality: Ethical
Considerations,” in Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings, ed. Martha J. Farah (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 2010), 147-54.
3. For a clear and concise introduction to the expansive language, attributes, and perspectives of
neuroethics, both past and present, see Eric Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics: Improving Treatment and
Understanding of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 27-51.
4. This group of scholars worked under and was formed by the political regime of George W.
Bush.
5. Henceforth, “the Council.”
6. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy: Essential Sources of Concern,” in
Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings, ed. Martha J. Farah (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010),
58-72. See especially pp. 69-75.
7. It is important to clarify that the logic inherent to the Council’s general positions vis-à-vis
biotechnological enhancement is herein applied specifically in the neurocognitive context. Hence, this
paper does not intend to misconstrue the original content of “Beyond Therapy” as representative of the
Council’s explicit address of neurocognitive enhancement, but only biotechnological enhancement
generally, which in turn may (presumably) be applied in specific contexts.
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in fact, with the desire to become perfected. The juxtaposition of these two polarized
positions will comprise the framework of the arguments explored in this paper.
To be sure, the issues of immediate import to the debate surrounding
neurocognitive enhancement are manifold, and any singular analysis of topics, no matter
how sweeping, will unavoidably fall short of adequacy. This paper recognizes such
limitations, and thus aims to briefly address but three: memory (recollection), executive
function,8 and emotional health and personality.9 The aim and proposal of the paper is to
examine the concepts of memory, executive function,10 and emotional health and
personality in the context of neurocognitive enhancement with the intention of positing
the argument that neurocognitive enhancement can justified as morally plausible in its
potential to edify the caliber of overall cognition and thus contribute to the ability make
pragmatically robust moral decisions on the conditions that it (i) promotes general moral
character, (ii) compliments human nature, and (iii) effects a deeper sense of individual11
and social12 identity.
MORAL CHARACTER AND THE MEMORABLE-RECOLLECTIVE BRAIN
A first point of divergence in the enhancement debate concerns moral character.
Refocused in the context of neurocognition, it specifically concerns how moral character
is affected by manipulating the natural human capacity to recollect. Generally speaking,
human identity is reducible in part to the decisions one makes, the actions one pursues,
and the responsibility taken for the sum of the parts. Hence, whom one is flows forth
from what one decides to do and acts on doing, and moral character is shaped by this
means. Utilizing neurotechnological enhancement is one such decision and action that
significantly affects and shapes moral character. Since more than just biophysiology is as
stake in the choice to pursue neurocognitive enhancement, recognition of the promises
and perils of its effects on identity, mentality, free will, and, particularly in considerations
of the mind-brain relationship, memory, are things for which moral character, shaped by
moral responsibility, must account.
Hubris and Humility

8. For coverage of both memory (recollection) and executive function, see Farah et al.,
“Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 30-41. See especially pp. 31-34.
9. See Canli and Amin, “Neuroimaging of Emotion and Personality,” 147-54.
10. By this phrase is meant the neurocognitive abilities that allow for flexible, task-oriented
responses in the face of manifold and often competing neurological inputs or more habitual but
inappropriate behavioral response patterns. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 30-41. See
especially pp. 33-34.
11. These three conditions, among others, form the contra argument vis-à-vis enhancement of the
2003 President’s Council on Bioethics. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 58-72.
See especially pp. 58-65.
12. For an expansive examination of the social implications of neuroscience accompanied by an
epistemological framework for the neuroscience of ethics, see Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 179-213.

4
With regard to moral character, the Council’s rhetoric13 against enhancement is
couched in expressivist and consequentialist concerns. The former regards the idea that
the pursuit of enhancement itself denotes moral viciousness and, hence, poor moral
character. The latter regards the moral forecast that enhancement would inevitably lead to
the weakening of moral character. The strongest expressivist concern lies in the Council’s
contention that pursuing enhancement fails to exemplify respect for “the given” in nature
and instead exhibits the hubris of those who act with “hyper-agent” wisdom they fail to
possess.14 Since appreciation is the product of humility – a precondition for the
possession of other moral virtues – enhancement inevitably proves a stumbling block for
the development of virtues necessary to live a substantive moral life. In this sense, the
Council’s stance is equal parts essentialist and consequentialist.15
Applied in the context of neurocognitive enhancement, the Council’s threefold
premises include the notions that (i) appreciation for what one has been given is a human
good of central importance that develops virtuous moral character; (ii) the pursuit of
nontherapeutic memory enhancement as a form of mastery and perfection is ultimately at
odds with this sense of appreciation; and (iii) the employment of memory enhancement
and its products are an instance of the pursuit of mastery or perfection. From these
premises can be derived two fundamental conclusions. The first is that the employment of
memory enhancement is ultimately incongruous with appreciation for “the given” in
nature. The second is that the employment of memory enhancement is ultimately
incongruous with a central human good of which virtuous moral character requisitely
consists.16
The Morality of Memory Encoding
This paper finds such essentialist and consequentialist logic misguided.
Essentialist and consequentialist concerns are typically the culprit of two primary errors.
First, they assume that all persons who pursue enhancement possess an insatiable craving
for mastery or perfection.17 Second, essentialist and consequentialist concerns take the
notion of gratitude at face value rather than considering it a vague concept expressive of
something more appropriate and less bogged down by theological rhetoric.18 To be sure,
13. Included in the introductory remarks of “Beyond Therapy” is the Council’s recognition that “it
will be hard to say what is wrong with any biotechnological intervention that could improve our
performances. . . . Indeed, in many cases, we ought to be thankful for or pleased with the improvements our
technological ingenuity is making possible.” They spend the remainder of the document, however,
endeavoring to explicate precisely why they are not. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond
Therapy,” 58-72. See especially p. 58.
14. The President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 59-61.
15. This logic is echoed most notably by the political philosopher Michael Sandel. For a thorough
analysis of the expressivist and consequentialist concerns of the “anti-enhancement” camp, see Sandel’s
The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007).
16. See the President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 59-61.
17. The necessitation of spectacles for night driving, for example, proves foolish this point. Surely
the driver desires neither mastery nor perfection in the endeavor to ensure the safety of self and others.
18. Both the vagueness and the presupposition of the theological nature underlying the concept of
gratitude are swiftly identified upon posing the question, “to what/whom?”
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every person should be concerned with the risks of becoming exceedingly focused on the
beneficial effects of enhancement to the extent that they cease to be appreciative of the
things they have. But such risks are not ipso facto unavoidable, and a person who focuses
on what is to be gleaned from neurocognitive enhancement at the cost of appreciating
current possessions already exhibits a deficiency in moral character.
Moreover, essentialist and consequentialist concerns fail to acknowledge the
possibility that memory enhancement may preserve, if not explicitly develop, one’s sense
of appreciation. If this can be defended, then memory enhancement can be said to fortify
moral character. Consider the use of drugs that regulate APMA19 receptors to aid in
depolarization, or that increase CREB,20 a gene-activating molecule that produces
proteins and buttresses synaptic strength. Applied to middle-aged and elderly
populations,21 the ability to encode new memories would allow for a deeper experience
ex post facto of critically significant life events.22 This enhancement certainly possesses
the potential to lead to a deeper sense of appreciation for the already given, not a
movement away from it.23,24 In the context of human health and well being, then, the
“respect” argument seems to be one in favor of, not against, enhancement. Understood in
this light, enhancing neurocognitive endowments seems to promote, not detract from,
moral character, thereby edifying the caliber of overall cognition and thus contributing to
the ability make pragmatically robust moral decisions.
HUMAN NATURE AND THE EXECUTIVE-FUCTIONAL BRAIN
A second point of divergence in the enhancement debate concerns human nature.
Refocused in the context of neurocognition, it specifically concerns how human nature is
affected by manipulating the conception of one’s existence in the world. The
philosophical conception of human nature as a set of shared moral ideals between human
beings that distinguishes them from all other beings can be traced to the Aristotelian
corpus. If these ideals are considered natural, they are consequentially regarded as
essential rather than contingent or superfluous. This logic lends to the interpretation that
if human beings were to lose any of the moral characteristics considered essential to
human identity, they would cease to be human. The question is thus raised over whether
neurocognitive enhancement contributes to or depreciates human nature.
The “Unnatural” Means of Human Dignity
With regard to human nature, two primary concerns frame the Council’s argument
against enhancement. The first is that enhancement will alter or obliterate human nature,
19. Amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole propionic acid.
20. cAMP response element-binding protein.
21. Neurocognitive studies have indicated that this population in particular stand to gain most
from memory enhancement technologies. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 31-32.
22. The analysis of increasingly controversial memory augmentations such as dampening and
vivifying transcend the scope of this paper.
23. Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 31-32.
24. More to the point, an adequate sense of appreciation for “the given” in nature includes the
appreciation of everything that is given, including memory enhancement techniques.
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rending it man-made and therefore “cheap.”25 The second is that if enhancement alters or
obliterates human nature, this will affect one’s ability to determine the good, because the
ability to determine something is dependant on the nature of the determiner.26 As it
pertains to the first concern, the principal fear is that one or more of the characteristics
essential to human nature will inevitably be manipulated by neurocognitive enhancement,
rendering one an alien to oneself (and others). The continual creation of these
“transhuman others”27 might eventually result in the extinction of human beings. Since it
is illogical to tamper with the wisdom of nature, it follows that it is illogical to attempt to
become “better than well.” Thus, participation in enhancement would leave one with only
the prodigality of free will.28
The second part of the argument is based on the notion that human goodness is
inextricably linked to human nature. Transcending this nature – becoming “God-like” –
undermines the apprehension and valuation of goodness, rendering nothing save for
experiential, and thus existential, misunderstanding. Since understanding and valuing the
good is essential to moral living, human beings must do everything possible to preserve
it. Hence, any neurocognitive enhancement that would augment human nature is
discouraged and must be avoided. In this view, human actions flow forth from human
nature. Once nature is sacrificed by participating in enhancement, thereby “cheating”
oneself out of oneself, the ability to determine the good and act upon it is lost.29
The Folly of Normative Essentialism
This paper rejects such normative essentialism30 as implausible for several
reasons. First, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with altering human nature by means
of enhancing executive function since the “naturally given” clearly contains both good
and bad elements31 and because there is no persuasive reason to believe that in every
effort to nuance the poor elements there would exist a disproportionate risk posed to
those considered good.32 Second, if it were the case that executive function enhancement
would “obliterate” human nature by transforming human beings into “hyper-agents,” this
25. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 61-64. See especially p. 62.
26. The metaphorical language used by the Council to demonstrate this point includes the
inevitable gap created between “the dancer and the dance.” See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond
Therapy,” 61-64. See especially p. 64.
27. The Council also invokes concepts such as “God-like,” “hyper-agency,” “better than well,”
“cheating,” “self-alienation,” “better model,” “less than human,” and several others to describe
transhumanist desires. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 58-72.
28. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 61-64.
29. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 61-64; 65-71.
30. Normative essentialism is the belief that comprehensive moral rules may be extracted from
reflection on human nature.
31. Consider, for example, executive function deficits such as attention disorders, working
memory miscues, and inhibitory control issues. While these are “naturally given,” no reasonable person
would consider them intrinsically good. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34.
32. To be sure, the use of drugs that target dopamine and noradrenaline neurotransmitter faculties
carry particular risks in the effort to augment the “naturally given” neurocognitive deficiencies, but
certainly not in every case, and almost always within the realm of reasonable proportion. See Farah et al.,
“Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34.
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action would not in itself be wrong and may in fact be morally right.33 Third, it does not
necessarily follow that adjusting human nature will result in the loss of the ability to
make judgments about the good, because human beings requisitely possess a conception
of the good by which they evaluate human nature itself.34 Finally, appeals to human
nature generally effect obscurity in the moral debate over enhancement and can be
ameliorated with more apposite considerations.
Applied in the context of executive function enhancement, the third reason above
deserves immediate attention. What underlies the erroneous normative essentialist claim
that nature and goodness are inextricably linked is the idea that to decipher whether
something is good, one needs to know if it conforms to, or “fits” with, human nature.
This paper has already noted one reason35 to reject this claim: appealing to the role nature
plays in decision making is largely about recognizing constraints; therefore, rather than
rendering human beings incapable of judging rightly – which is the (preexistent)
existential plight of those to whom neurocognitive deficiencies have been “naturally
given” – participation in executive function enhancement would simply require the
consideration of new constraints.36 Based on the innate desire to evolve, then,
participation in neurocognitive enhancement may be seen in this light as complimentary
of, not a detraction from, human nature, thereby edifying the caliber of overall cognition
and thus contributing to the ability make pragmatically robust moral decisions.
IDENTITY AND THE EMOTIONAL-PERSONAL BRAIN
A third point of divergence in the enhancement debate concerns individual and
social identity. Refocused in the context of neurocognition, it specifically concerns the
individual and social effects of augmenting one’s identity in ways pertaining to emotional
health and personality. To be human is to be a particular person, with a particular history,
and with particular loves and memories that bind one to behave in particular ways. The
possibilities of neurocognitive enhancement offer entry into an uncharted plane of being
within which who one understands oneself to be in relation to self and society37 may be
significantly amplified through techniques that would allow for emotional and personal
33. Prima facie, the action in question may at worst be considered morally neutral but by no
means clearly and objectively morally wrong.
34. This exemplifies, among others, the logical fallacy of circulus in demonstrando.
35. There is, however, a second and more important reason to reject this claim: human beings
already make coherent and reasonable judgments concerning human nature that can persuasively argue in
favor of augmentation. Recognizing flaws in human nature – e.g., deficits of executive function such as
attention disorders, working memory miscues, and inhibitory control issues – suggests that human beings
have a concept of human nature that is independent of human nature itself. See Farah et al.,
“Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34.
36. One plausible constraint would be to allow enhancement therapies to be accessed by only
those most likely to benefit from them, which has typically proven to be those with the lowest working
memory capacities, significant attention disorders, and multiple inhibitory control issues. Interestingly, at
least one study has shown that the use of dopamine agonist bromocriptine improves the neurocognitive
performance of individuals with a less-than-average working memory but lowers the performance of those
with the highest natural capacities. See Farah et al., “Neurocognitive Enhancement,” 33-34.
37. For a still further analysis of the sociological implications of the promised future of
neuroscience and its accompanying neuroethics, see Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 215-21.
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maturation or blunting. Issues related to moral responsibility and “manufactured”
perceptions are hence inevitably called into question.
Plentiful Ends, Partial Flourishing
With regard to individual and social identity, the Council’s position against
enhancement manifests itself in two primary veins. The first refers to the idea that
enhancement threatens the most precious piece of human existence: idiosyncratic
identity. The second turns on the first, and concerns the notion that participation in
enhancement provides others with the means to manipulate the identity that should be
solely one’s own to “work out.” As it pertains to the first concern, enhancement is
viewed to remove the intelligible means necessary to understand one’s particularity in
shared time and space.38 Participation thus threatens this essential identity, which is
inextricably linked to moral responsibility,39 by allowing it to be usurped by the cold and
impersonal hand of biotechnology. Consequentially, “self-alienation” is the inevitable
destination on the journey toward actualizing this naïve “achievement.”40
The second part of the argument clings to the notion that enhancement effectively
“de-agents” the subject and allows the “enhancer” to assume the subject’s identity as
biotechnological puppet-master par excellence. Since personal achievements can only be
personally achieved, it follows that impersonal achievements cannot be considered the
work of individual persons.41 While it can be said that an individual self uses cognitive
drugs to, for example, increase alertness, it cannot be said that an individual self thereby
does the “alerting.” Rather, pharmacologicals have acted in place of a self and goals have
been achieved only by means of sacrificing personal independence. The cardinal idea is
that to be independent essentially requires possessing individual limits. Thus, by the mere
act of participating in enhancement one undermines42 one’s own identity.43
Against Self-Reductionism
This paper rejects such self-reductionism for reasons beyond its unfortunate
tendency to paint the unflattering portrait of people who pursue neurocognitive
enhancement as unintelligent “identity-thieves” who prostitute dignity for gain at the cost
of personal integrity. The position here is that emotional health and personality
enhancement can promote individual and social identity for at least two reasons. The first
38. For the Council, “to be human is to be someone, not anyone – with a given nature (male or
female), given natural abilities (superior wit or musical talent), and, most important, a real history of
attachments, memories, and experiences, acquired largely by living with others.” See President’s Council
on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64.
39. In this way, identity is intimately linked with the conception and constitution of moral
character.
40. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64-65.
41. The metaphorical image used to capture this point is the student behind the calculator. Using
the calculator does not de facto render the student a “knower” of mathematics, even if the student arrives at
the correct answer through its use. See President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64-65.
42. In this case, a “pseudo-happiness” has been achieved at the cost of the same individual self
necessary to secure a sense of happiness that can be called genuine and personal.
43. President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy,” 64-65.
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concerns the idea that emotional health and personality enhancement may be used to
correct existing individual neurocognitive deficiencies that result in individual injustices.
The second concerns the idea that emotional health and personality enhancement may be
used to correct individual neurocognitive deficiencies that result in social injustices. To
exemplify the former, consider neurological studies that provide insight into the benefits
of developing cognitive drugs that enhance underdeveloped neural correlates regulating
negative emotions related to moral violations. The use of neurocognitive
pharmacologicals may promise brain regions previously undeveloped, yet nonetheless
implicated in moral development, a greater personal emotional content in moral stimuli.44
So doing may combat individual injustices45 by leading to a comprehensively balanced
understanding of idiosyncratic moral responsibility and the essential role of emotion in
systematic decision-making.46
The second reason may be exemplified by considering neurological studies that
provide insight into the benefits of developing cognitive drugs that enhance
underdeveloped neural mechanisms47 that process moral sensitivity to issues related to
justice and care. The use of neurocognitive pharmacologicals may promise activation to
regions of the brain that experience abnormalities associated with dissociable neural
processing events.48 So doing may combat social injustices49 by leading to a deeper
awareness of concerns related to social justice while simultaneously developing one’s
individual identity as related to others in the collective mission to express care and
respect for well-being.50 In light of these reasons, then, neurocognitive enhancement may
be defended as affecting a deeper sense of individual and social identity; thereby edifying
the caliber of overall cognition and thus contributing to the ability make pragmatically
robust moral decisions.
CONCLUSION
44. Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 186.
45. Thus, rather than effectively sacrificing or annihilating one’s sense of self, emotional health
and personality enhancement can be defended as the gateway into one’s authentic self and the individual
moral responsibilities such a discovery demands one to observe.
46. Other emotional health and personality enhancement studies promotive of individual identity
include, among others, the influence of bodily harm on neural correlates of semantic and moral decision
making, the moral affiliation of disgust, and affective responses to one’s own moral violations. See Racine,
Pragmatic Neuroethics, 184-89.
47. These include the polar medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal posterior cingulated cortex, and
posterior superior temporal sulcus. See Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 185.
48. These would include a dormant left intraparietal sulcus, which is associated with sensitivity to
justice issues, or a dormant ventral posterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, and thalamus, which is associated with sensitivity to care issues. See Racine, Pragmatic
Neuroethics, 185.
49. Thus, rather than effectually obscuring and demoting social identity, emotional health and
personality enhancement can be defended an as invitation to participate more deeply and responsibly in the
social story of which one is an integral individual part, thereby promoting the rational capacity to decipher
the good.
50. Other emotional health and personality enhancement studies promotive of social identity
include, among others, gender differences in neural mechanisms underlying moral sensitivity, the neural
basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment, and the functional networks in emotional moral
and nonmoral social judgments. See Racine, Pragmatic Neuroethics, 184-89.
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Memory, executive function, and emotional health and personality are but three
issues of principal significance in the debate over the moral licitness of neurocognitive
enhancement. Through the lens of a critical-dialogical framework, the aim of this paper
has been to address the aforementioned issues with the intention of positing the argument
that neurocognitive enhancement can be justified as morally plausible in its potential to
edify the caliber of overall cognition and thus contribute to the ability make
pragmatically robust moral decisions on the conditions that it (i) promotes general moral
character, (ii) compliments human nature, and (iii) effects a deeper sense of individual
and social identity. To that end it has been successful.
The implications here are significant. To be sure, the reality of enhancement
extremism is a genuine and growing fear. But rather than allowing it to terminate human
progress, it may instead serve to remind that while the benefits of neurocognitive
technologies are important, how and how far they are utilized is more important still.
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